



Garnishment Proceedings-Waiver of Contempt.-Holbrook v. Ford,
39 N. E. Rep. iog (Ill.). Where a receiver has voluntarily
made himself a defendant in a garnishment suit by which a cred-
itor attempts to reach assets claimed by the receiver, his right to,
assert that the creditor, in instituting the garnishment proceedings,
is guilty of contempt of court, is thereby waived.
Garnishable Property--ercentage on Condition of Faithful Perform-
ance of Contract.-American Forcite Powder Mfg. Co. v. Locust Moun-
tain Coal &- Iron Co. et al., 3' Ati. Rep. 90 (Pa.). Where contract
-provides for the setting aside of a certain percentage of contractor's
pay for each month as a security for the faithful performance of
the contract, the amounts retained are not subject to garnishment
by the contractor's creditors unless the contract has been faith-
fully performed.
Garnishment- Liabliy of Counties. -Slenner v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 38 Pac. Rep. 839 (Col.). The facts in this case are
unimportant,, and the only point discerned by the court was the
liability of a county to garnishment. Under the code "Munici-
pal Corporations " are subject to the garnishee process, but
nothing is said as to quasi-corporations. It was argued that
county is a municipal corporation and so should be held liable to,
garnishment. But the court, after a review of prior legislation.
upon this point, finally concluded that a county was not a munici-
pal corporation, but a quasi-corporation, and therefore could not
be held.
Garnishment--Jurisdiction-xevm~ion.-Atchison, T'. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Maggard, 39 Pac. Rep. 985 (Col.). In a garnishment pro-
cess against a Kansas corporation operating a continuation of its
line in Colorado, a citizen of the latter State obtained process by
the proceeding in rem. The company moved to have the court
dismiss them as garnishee on the ground that their employee
whose wages were thus sought to be reached was a resident of
Kansas; that his wages were earned outside the State of Colorado,
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and therefore without the jurisdiction of this court. And further,
his wages were exempt to him by virtue of the laws -of the State
in which he lived. The court held that exemption laws have no
extraterritorial force, but that as the indebtedness of the gar-
nishee to the employee does not follow the domicile of the creditor,
the Colorado court could have no jurisdiction.
Garnishment-Prioriy of Jurisdiction of Different Courts-Liabil-
ity of Defendant.-Afack v. Winslow, z6 U. S. App. 602. D insti-
tuted a guit for the recovery of a debt against B. & Sons in a
Kentucky court, and the defendant removed said suit to a circuit
court of the United States, where judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff. During the pendency of this suit and before judgment
had been rendered, M began suit for the recovery of a debt
against D in an Ohio State court, and on the ground of D's non-
residence, garnisheed the debt owing D from B. & Sons. The
Ohio court rendering judgment for D ordered B. & Sons, the
garnishe.es, to pay the amount of the judgment to D, whereupon
B. & Sons filed a bill of interpleader in the United States Cirtuit
Court for the District of Kentucky, Ricks, District Judge, deliver-
ing the opinion of that court: "The prior pendency of a suit
involying the same subject-matter is the test of priority in juris-
dictio'n. * * * The defendants in the suit in the United States
Circuit Court, under the authority of Wallace v. McConnell, 1 3 Pet.
136, were not therefore amenable to the garnishee process under
the attachment proceedings in the Ohio court * * * but were
first bound to answer fully the orders and judgments of the Uni-
ted States Circuit Court, and having done so were protected
thereby.
LIENS.
Notice.-Alexandria Building Co. v. McHugh, 40 N. E. Rep. 8o
(Ind.). "After the contract has been once completed and the
statutory limitation begins to run, can a party revive an expired
right of lien which he has lost in consequence of laches, by per-
forming some work in the house, such as merely patching the
plastering, after work has been substantially completed?" Ross,
C. J., held that if the appellee fails to file notice of his intention
to hold a lien within the time designated by the statute, his right
thereto is lost.
.Mechanics' Liens- Certificate- Consent of Owner-Labor.-Bor-
der, et al. v. Mercer, 39 N. E. Rep. 413. A claimant of a mechanics'
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lien will not be denied if his certificate sets out a true account of
the amount due him with all just credits given, although he fails
to set out the contract price, there being no intention to mislead
and no one being actually misled. Advances made to intervening
contractors by the owner of the building will imply the latter's
consent. The contractor may charge the profit on labor above
the market price if it can be shown what such labor was worth.
Mortgake-Priorio of Mechanics' Lien -Poreign Corporations.-
Chapman v. Brewer, et al., 62 N. W. Rep. 320 (Neb.). This was
an action of foreclosure upon a real estate mortgage. Besides the
Brewers a manufacturing company was made a defendant. A
cross-bill was filed by this company, setting up a mechanic's lien
prior in point of time to the mortgage of Chapman, and the court
held that the lien of a mechanic was superior to a real estate
mortgage, provided the latter was not recorded before any mater-
ials were furnished or actual work commenced; and that mort-
gages taken while a building is being erected are subject to the
liens of mechanics.
Mechanic's Lien-Liabili(y of Testator's Esate-Devisee's Exemp-
tion.-7'ubridy v. Wright, et al, 39 N. E. 640 (N. Y.). Action
brought against executors of deceased to foreclose a mechanic's
lien. Plaintiff had contracted with deceased to do certain work
on the latter's real property, but the deceased died before contract
was completed. The executors, to whom deceased had devised
his property in trust, ordered plaintiff to complete the contract,
which he did. Thereafter, within the time prescribed by statute,
a lien was filed against the property for the entire sum then
remaining unpaid upon the contract. Held, that plaintiff could
only recover for that work done under direct orders of the execu-
tors.
LIMITATIONb.
Limitations-Suspension by Non-residence.- Batchelder v. Barber,
3' AtI. Rep. 293 (Vt.). In order to claim under the statute of
limitations for non-residence of debtor it is necessary to show that
such debtor, while residing without the State, did not have known
property within the State that could have been attached by the
common process of law.
Adverse Possession- Limitation -Running of Statute- Change of
Statute.-MacAuliff v. Parker, 38 Pac. Rep. 744. The Statute of
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Limitations will not begin to run until there is some one to sue or
be sued, but when it has once commenced to run it will not cease
for any reason not expressly provided in the statute. And when
the period of limitations is changed by a subsequent statute to a
shorter period, the period of the former no longer obtains, and
upon the determination of the shorter period recoVery will be
barred.
Linitation-Assuption of Note.-Stinson v. Aultman, Miller
CO., 38 Pac. Rep. 788. Defendant, an attorney, assumed, in writ-
ing, a note payable to plaintiffs, who, about the time the note
became due, sent it to the defendant for collection. Note returned
uncollected, and after seven years the plaintiffs learn of defen-
dant's assumption, and sue him upon it. Held: That the defen-
dant's assumption of the note was not harmful to the plaintiffs,
and did not interfere with their right of action against the maker
of the note; also that an action on the written instrument was
barred by the Statute of Limitation which began to run, not at
discovery of the written assumption, but at the maturity of the
note.
Limitations-Residence in Another State.- Webster v. Davies, 62 N.
W. Rep. 484 (Neb.). Plaintiff brought action against defendant
for several promissory notes executed and delivered in the State of
Nebraska, while defendant was a resident of that State. Defen-
dant answered that for more than three years prior to the time
the action was brought he had been a resident of Wyoming, and
that the statute of the latter State (introduced in evidence) provided
that, where an indebtedness of this character arose before defen-
dant went to the State, action must be brought thereon within
two years. Held: That an action was barred in Nebraska when
the defendant had resided in another State for the full period of
limitations under the laws of that State, even though the cause of
action arose in the former State and the defendant resided there
when it arose.
Limitation of Actions-Acknowledgment to Third Party.-Miller v.
Teeter, 31 Atl. Rep. 394 (N. J.). A bill was brought to foreclose
a mortgage, and the answer set up the bar of the statute of limi-
tations. The evidence showed that at the request of the defen-
dant a third party wrote a letter to the complainant concerning a
mortgage held by said complainant against the farm of the defen-
dant, saying that the defendant had made arrangements to pay it
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off, and would like to have the complainant bring said mortgage
to him, or send it to some responsible man and let the defendant
send the complainant a check for the money. BIRD, V. C., held
that, although an acknowledgment of the debt to a stranger
would not ordinarily prevent the intervention of the statute, yet
when the purpose of the debtor in making the acknowledgment
to a stranger was that it should be communicated by the latter to
the creditor, the creditor may rely upon it, and it would defeat
the statute of limitations.
GENERAL CASES.
Railroad Commissioners-Right to Free Pass.-Zn re Board of Rail-
road Commissioners, 32 N. Y. Supp. 1115. Art. 13, § 5, of the Con-
stitution, i895, New York State, provides that no public officer
shall ask or receive "for his own use and benefit" any free pass.
This does not prohibit the railroad conimissioners in the discharge
of their official duties from traveling on- passes signed by the
Secretary of State, requiring railroad companies to carry them
without charge as provided by Laws 1882, c. 353.
Trade-Names-Znfringement-Injunction.---Chas. S. ffiggins Co.
v. Higgins Soap Co., 39 N. E. Rep. 490 (N. Y. App.). An action
brought to restrain the use of a corporate name. Defendant
obtained judgment in the lower courts, on the ground that the
-company had a right to use the family name of its organizers, and
to apply the name to their products. This was reversed by the
-court of appeals, which held that any simulation of name which
might mislead the public, and divert trade from the original com-
pany, was ground for injunction, the defendant company deriving
-no immunity from the fact that it had chosen the family name of
one of its members.
Trustee. -Harrison v. Union Trust Co. of New York, 39 N. E.
Rep. 353. On the sale of a railroad under foreclosure of a trust
mortgage, the trustee received two checks, which it failed to col-
lect. The bondholders refused to affirm" the sale; ordered a new
sale, and bought the road themselves. A complaint was brought
asking for the removal of the trustee, an accounting and an exe-
cution of a conveyance to the purchaser at the last foreclosure.
The court held that as the complaint does not allege that the rail-
road was ever possessed by the defendant, it is therefore insuffi-
cient to compel an accounting. That, where a decree of foreclos-
-ure requires the trustee to convey property, and he refuses to do
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so, an action cannot be maintained to compel such trustee to con-
vey, since the decree in such action would be merely a repetition
-of the decree already made. But where a decree of foreclosure
of a trust mortgage requires the trustee to convey, his refusal to
<do so is cause for removal.
Wife's Separate Properzy-Liabiliy on Bond-Securiv for Husband
- Want of Consideration.- Williamson v. Cline, 20 S. E. Rep. 917
(W. Va.). Where a married woman may make binding contracts
as to her sole and separate estate, a plea of coverture will not
avail in a suit against her as surety for her husband's debt. An
extension of time of payment for one day by the creditor will be
a sufficient consideration for her bond, although she herself
Teceives no benefit. A judgment against her will be a lien on
the property she possesses in her own name, including that
.acquired subsequently to the contract.
